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As I have pointed out in the discussion of the study's approach, much
of the method amounts, in. essence, to a correlation analysis; but due to
the small number of observations (the "subperiods"), it is a mostly
intuitive inference, rather than formal. I have also argued, in that dis-
cussion, that a formal analysis based on a large number of observations,
in which each quarter is taken as a unit of measurement of the vari-
ables concerned, is not likely to be very helpful. Nevertheless, I have
carried out a number of experimental correlation analyses, which are
described here.
First, Table A-i presents the outcome of the simplest experiment,
in which the size of each dependent variable in a given quarter is
assumed to be a function of the sizes of the independent variables in
the same quarter. The dependent variables are, in turn, three monetary
variables: the discount rate; the rate of change of money supply; and
the rate of change of credit supply. The independent variables are the
four targets assumed in this study as conceivably guiding monetary
policy: the balance-of-payments position, measured by the change in
external reserves and designated by B; the price level, measured by the
change in the cost-of-living index and designated by P; the employment
position, measured by the unemployment ratio and designated by U;
and, finally, the growth target, measured by the change in the industrial-
production index and designated by G. The table records only correla-
tion coefficients which are significant at.the .95 level. When a coefficient
appears with the right sign (that is, the sign expected from the assump-
tion that the instrument in question responds to the need of the target
in question), the coefficient is italicized.
The results of Table A-i are quite meager. Little dependence of the
monetary instruments on the major economic targets is revealed. The
highest R2 recorded (.538) is in Germany, with credit supply as the
dependent variable. But in this case, as also with the variable of money
supply in Germany, the result may be discounted altogether. CreditTABLE A-i
COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION OF MONETARY













B P U G
Belgium:
Discount rate .601 .320 — — — .573 —
Moneysupply .440 .142 .302 — — — .252
Credit supply .440 .106 .310 — — —
France:
Discount rate .581 .286 — .407
Money supply — — .351 —
Creditsupply — — — — .344
Germany:
Discount rate .583 .297 .351 .250 .486 —
Moneysupply .428 .131 — — .394 —
Creditsupply .750 .538 — — 526 .504
Italy:
Money supply .559 .257 .323 — — .410 .378
Credit supply — — — — — .400
Japan:
Discount rate —— .284
Money supply — —
Creditsupply — —
Netherlands:
Discount rate .446 147 — — — .408
Money supply .517 .220 .496 — —
Creditsupply .396 .102 —.3 36 — —
Sweden:
Discountrate — —. — — —
MOneysupply .442 .140 .317 —
Credit supply — — — —
•U.K.:'
Discount rate — — — .279 — —
Moneysupply — — — — .330
Credit supply — — — — —
U.S.:
Discount rate — —
Moneysupply — .310
Credit supply — —APPENDIX 283
supply and money supply appear, in Germany, to be dependent on the
employment situation; but this is patently due to general trends of fall-
ing unemployment and falling rates of expansion of money and credit
in this country. Outside Germany, the highest correlations (R2) are
within the range of about .3, which is very low indeed.
It should be pointed out that despite the meagerness of the results,
they largely conform with those arrived at in the main body of analysis
of this study. Thus, with the exception of one instance (Sweden), all
the cases of dependence of one monetary instrument or another on the
balance-of-payments position (Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands,
and the U.K.) have been demonstrated before. But the opposite is not
true: many instances of such demonstrated dependence are not re-
vealed by the correlation analysis. A glaring example of this is the case
of Japan.
Table A-2 presents the results of a similar analysis, except that it
introduces a time lag: the size of the dependent variable (monetary
instrument) in each quarter is assumed to be a function of the size of
the independent variables (the targets) during the preceding two
ters. The outcome as a whole is again quite disappointing. Table A-2
shows a clear improvement over the performance of Table A-i in two
countries: France, and the U.K. In both instances, the outcome agrees
with the findings arrived at by the main body of analysis of this study.
In other cases, however, there are mostly fewer and less meaningful
findings when the time lag is introduced than without it.
Particularly baffling is the outcome concerning the discount rate.
Table A-i shows a significant (but quite small) correlation of this
instrument in the right direction in only one instance: in the U.K.,
it appears to depend on the target of the balance of payments. In Table
A-2, some improvement is ap.parent: a dependence of the discount
rate on the balance-of-payments position is seen also in France, where
the discount rate appears to depend also on the unemployment situa-
tion. Dependence of the discount rate on the price level appears in Ger-
many and the Netherlands, and in the latter also on the unemployment
position. All these positive findings still amount to quite little. Table A-3
presents the result of an attempt to improve this performance by ob-
servation of selected points only. There is a general tendency, in almost
all countries, not to vary the discount rate very often but, at most,
about once or twice a year on the average. Thus, long periods may be
found in which the target variables move, but the discount rate remains
stable. It might be expected that if these periods are abstracted from,TABLE A-2
COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION OF INSTRUMENTS












B P U G
Belgium:
Discount rate .583 .292 — — .549
Money supply .413 .115 — —.276
Credit supply — — — —
France:
Discount rate .758 .542 —.422 .483 —.377
Money supply .460 .151 .317 —
Creditsupply — — — —
Germany:
Discount rate .552 .259 — .409 .399
Money supply .487 .186 — .374 .326
Credit supply .652 .386 — — .546
Italy:
Money supply — — — — .302 —
Creditsupply .543 .235 — — .536
Japan:
Discount rate .513 .210 ——.363
Money supply — — — —
Creditsupply — — — —
Netherlands:
Discount rate .678 .424 .315—.552—.270
Money supply .353 .066 — —






Discount rate .480 .179 —.412 —.379 —_ —
Moneysupply — — — — — .319






COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION OF DISCOUNT-RATE














B P U G
Belgium — — — — .503 —
France .858 .605 — — — .642 —
Germany
Japan — — — — — —
Netherlands .797 .531 — .688 — —
Sweden .860 .624 .843 — — .710
U.K. — — — — — —
U.S. — — — — — —
•and only periods of changes in the discount rate are left, the real
motivations of these changes stand a better chance of being revealed.
Thus, Table A-3 presents coefficients of correlation of the discount rate
with the target variables when only quarters in which discount-rate
changes took place are considered, and each such change is assumed
to be a function of the target variables during the preceding two quar-
ters. The results of this procedure are again disappointing: if anything,
the performance is even worse than in Tables A-i and A-2. The dis-
count rate appears to depend on any of the target variables in only
four instances. In Belgium, a dependence of the rate on the unemploy-
ment position is shown; but the multiple-correlation coefficient, which
would show the dependence of the rate on all targets combined, is
insignificant. In France, a dependence of the rate on the unemployment
position appears, as it has also appeared in Table A-2; but the level of
unemployment in France has been so low, throughout the period, that
such a dependence would be hardly credible. In the Netherlands the
rate seems to be correlated with the price-level target—a finding which
would agree with that of the study's text. Finally, in Sweden the rate
appears to be correlated, even strongly so, with the rate of change of
industrial production—a somewhat surprising finding not only in view
of the main body of the study's analysis, but also when compared with
Tables A-i and A-2.286 APPENDIX
Lastly, Table A-4 presents the outcome of an attempt to tackle the
problem on hand in a somewhat different manner. The balance-of-
payments target is taken here as the dependent variable, and the three
monetary instruments as the independent variables. The multiple cor-
relation coefficient would then show the association of the target with
all the three instruments combined; whereas the partial correlations
would show the association with each separate monetary instrument.
The results, again, are not encouraging. Once more, Japan is the most
obvious case: no significant correlation of the balance of payments with
monetary policy appears at all in this country. But other associations as
well, though significant, seem to be quite weak. Among the separate
instruments, associations of the balance-of-payments target appear for
money supply in Belgium, France, Italy, and the Netherlands; and for
credit supply in Belgium. These findings agree with those of the study's
text; but they represent only a small fraction of the latter. Again, par-
ticularly disappointing is the performance of the discount rate, as it is
represented here.
All the experiments demonstrated in this appendix appear, thus, to
have been unsuccessful. If conclusions had to be drawn from their find-
ings, they would have been grossly misleading in many instances. It is,
of course, conceivable that an improved performance of this method
TABLE A-4
COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION OF MONETARY











































Sweden — — — — —
U.K. .273 .046 — — —
U.S. — — — — —APPENDIX 287
could be achieved in a variety of other ways, such as by the elimination
of extreme observations; the introduction of a variety of time lags, not
necessarily uniform for all targets, and possibly of some model of dis-
tributed lags; the removal of trend factors; and the like. The amount of
experimentation required for these improvements would undoubtedly
have been very large—and its outcome of doubtful validity.